Cloud computing involves complex technical and economical systems and interactions. This brings about various challenges, two of which are: (1) debugging and control of computing systems, based on heterogeneous data, and (2) prediction of performance and price of "spot" resources, allocated via auctions. In this paper, we first establish two theoretical results on approximate causal inference. We then use the first one, approximate counterfactuals, along with established causal methodology, to outline a general framework to address (1). To address (2), we show how the second one, approximate integration of causal knowledge, can in principle provide a tool for cloud clients to trade off privacy against predictability of cloud costs. We report experiments on simulated and real data.
Introduction
In recent years, the paradigm and business model of cloud computing [2] has become increasingly popular. It allows to rent computing resources on-demand, and to use them efficiently by sharing them in a smart way, in particular using auctions to sell unused resources. Several new challenges arise from this paradigm. On a technical level, it is a problem to understand, control and debug the involved computing systems up to the size of several data centers, with as much automation as possible. On an economical level, while auctions for "spot" resources help providers to use resources more efficiently, the unpredictability of their prices and performance limits their utility for clients. In the absence of exact models, it is natural to try to address such problems using data driven methods [14, 13, 16, 7, 18] . However, standard machine learning only applies in i.i.d. settings, and does not make predictions about the effect of interventions, which is important though for debugging, control and integration of heterogeneous data. The present paper thus takes first steps towards addressing challenges of cloud computing using causal models [15, 17] . Inferring causal models from (observational) data is notoriously hard, and convincing applications of causal modeling to real world problems are scarce. The present paper is no exception in that the main focus is conceptual and methodological rather than empirical. Our main contributions are:
• We present two theoretical results for approximate causal inference, Propositions 1 and 2 in Section 2, which are of relevance for the subsequent cloud problems and beyond.
• In Section 3, we show how causal models and approximate counterfactuals form a unified approach for addressing cloud control and performance debugging problems.
• In Section 4, we use approximate integration of causal knowledge for first steps towards enabling cloud clients to better predict performance and costs, while preserving privacy.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 (additionally) contains basic concepts; Section 5 contains real-world and simulated experiments for our two approaches; in Section 6, we discuss related work; and we conclude the paper with Section 7.
Two approximations in causal inference

Causal models
In this paper, we generally assume variables to be discrete, although some results may also hold for the continuous case. Let V be a set of variables. A causal graphical model (CGM) Pearl [15] , Spirtes et al. [17] , over V consists of a directed acyclic graph (DAG) G with V as node set, called causal diagram or causal DAG, and a conditional probability density p X|PAX =paX (for all pa X in the domain of PA X ) for each X ∈ V , where PA X are the parents of X in G. A CGM M that includes, for each observed variable X, a (hidden) root background variable U X with an arrow only to X such that 
Structural counterfactuals and an approximation
Let M 0 be a FCM over a set V of variables, and a set U of background variables. Let E, X, Y be (sets of) variables in V . The structural counterfactual probability of Y being y, had X been x, given evidence E = e, can be defined [15] based on M 0 as
Even though computing systems are "more deterministic" than many other systems, due to interactions with the environment and missing information, one usually can only infer a CGM, and not a FCM, of a computer system. Without an FCM though, counterfactual probabilities (equation (1)) are generally not uniquely determined, i.e., they cannot be derived from a CGM. Now we show that nonetheless counterfactual probabilities can be calculated approximately, and one can know, from only the CGM, how wrong the approximation is at most (on average). This will be important for our approach to debugging in Section 3, and, as we belief, for other areas as well.
Let M be a CGM with W its set of root nodes. We define the approximate structural counterfactual or approximate counterfactual as
Let D(· ·) denote the Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence, H(·|·) the conditional entropy [8] . 
(where
We prove (using monotonicity of the KL divergence and properties of entropy) a generalization of Proposition 1 in Section A. To give some intuition about the approximate counterfactual and the proposition, we consider two special cases: If M is already a "FCM" in the sense that all its variables are completely determined by the root nodes, then we have H(E|W ) = 0, and thus, based on equation (5), both quantities coincide, which seems natural. If the evidence comprises the root nodes, W ⊂ E, then the approximation amounts to the simple conditional p(y|do (x), w) (where w is the part of e the corresponds to W ), similar as if we had evidence on all background variables in a FCM.
Approximate integration of causal knowledge in a special case
The following result will be will be important for Section 4 since it can be used to preserve some amount of privacy. 
Note that based on the proposition, again, we can know how wrong the approximation is at most, from the available information p(x k |c), p(c) only. A proof (again using monotonicity of the KL divergence and properties of entropy), can be found in Section B. To get an intuition, consider the case that all X k are fully determined by C: thenp(z) and p(z) coincide, which is reflected by k H(X k |C) being 0. An example of a causal model which implies the condition of the proposition is depicted in Figure 2 . While here we apply the proposition for a predictability-privacy problem in Section 4, it is more generally applicable where joint distributions are not available. Keep in mind that stronger statements on the set of possible p(z) under the available information may exist, e.g., based on ideas in [3] .
Problem 1 and approach: models for control and debugging
We start with the problem statement (Section 3.1), followed by our approach (Section 3.2). Then we discuss advantages of our approach over previous ones (Section 3.3). Note that an example of part of our approach applied to a specific system will be given in Section 5.1.
Problem statement
Cloud computing involves technical systems of the highest complexity, which have to be controlled and debugged, ideally in a (semi-)automatic way. More specifically, the control problem can be stated as follows: During the operation of a cloud server many "decisions" automatically have to be made regarding how resources, such as complete computers, or parts such as CPU time, are allocated among the various applications or virtual machines (VMs) of clients. The goal is to optimize this automatic decision making, based on some given utility function, encoding e.g. energy consumption, guarantees given to customers, or simply profit.
The (performance) debugging problem (closely related to "performance attribution") can be formulated as follows: the general goal is to understand which component of a system contributes to what extent to the measured performance and based on that, which components have to be modified to improve the performance (for instance: is the high latency caused from within a VM or by other, concurrent VMs). Note that we presently focus on debugging for individual observations. Usually, plenty of heterogeneous knowledge and data is available about the involved systems: expert knowledge, formal program code and system specifications (often containing non-causal associational knowledge), data from the very system or similar ones, and data from sandbox experiments.
General approach
We propose the following steps as the outline of a unified approach to harness the available heterogeneous information to address both, the control and the debugging problem. In what follows, we will refer to the cloud system "in production", i.e., the fully configured system with a specific set of applications, as the "target system". Note that, depending on the specific setup, some steps may be canceled.
Step 1A: inference of causal diagram and some mechanisms
Given: the various information sources described below.
Procedure: Keep in mind that the inference procedure we describe here is usually not based on the target system itself, since some details of it (such as the specific VMs running on it) are varying quickly, but instead on past experience with other systems of equal or similar configuration. In particular, usually not all details of the target system are known during this step, so that some mechanisms stay underdetermined, but can be inferred later during
Step 1B. As usual, the main sources for causal inference are randomized interventional experiments, observational data (deploying causal discovery methods [17, 12] ) and expert knowledge (plus possibly available program code and system architecture specifications). A necessary condition to harness the first two sources is the decision about -and performance of -measurements of the system, for which we propose to use tools discussed in [6, 16] . Note the important facts that (1) many aspects of computer systems (hardware and software) are -by design -modular, i.e., separable into individually manipulable input-output mechanisms, which is a central assumption in causal models [15] , and (2) the same (or similar) mechanisms occur in different systems, which is very helpful for extrapolation from experiments.
The output of this procedure is a causal diagram G of the target system, together with those mechanisms, i.e., conditionals in the causal model M of the target system, which can be inferred based on past experience. 3 For those mechanisms which cannot be known based on past experience, but only when the target system is revealed (e.g., the specific VMs running on it), but which cannot be explored directly on the target system either (since tentative configurations may violate contracts with clients [7, 18] ), we discuss the integration of sandbox experiments in Step 1B below, which should then complete the causal model M .
Step 1B: design and integration of sandbox experiments
Given: an additional cloud system, the "experimental system", equivalent in hardware to the target system, the causal diagram G of the target system, some variable X (e.g. performance of some VM) in G, and the identity (e.g., VM) but not all properties of the mechanism that produces X, and whose unknown properties should be inferred during the experiment.
Procedure: The knowledge of G allows to integrate sandbox experiments in a principled way: First, derive all direct influences of X from G, i.e., the parents PA X (which could include resources such as CPU time or size of requests received from the internet). Second, design the sandbox experiment on the experimental system such that all variables in PA X are randomly varied. Third, based on the gathered data, regress X on PA X and plug the inferred conditional p(x|pa X ) = p(x|do pa X ) as mechanism for X into M . This is possible since all parents of X were "intervened" and regressed upon.
Step 1C: control
Given: causal model M of the target system, some utility u, which is variable in M or a function of one or several variables in M , and some variable X (e.g. concurrent workload, CPU time, network bandwidth) in M , which should be controlled such as to optimize u.
Procedure: As M predicts the effect on u of modifying any of its mechanisms, it can be used to find the mechanism, or "policy", p(x|pa X ) = π(x, pa X ), which maximizes u.
Step 1D: observation-level performance debugging
Given: causal model M of the target system, a variable Y in M that measures the performance, a performance debugging query Q containing a variable X, and an (individual) observation y, x, f , where f can be a measurement of an additional variable F of the target system.
Procedure: For the performance debugging statement Q, we assume the following form: "It would improve performance Y from the current y to y ′ , if instead of its current state x, we would set X to x ′ , given side information F = f ." Stated this way, it seems natural to translate this statement into the structural counterfactual probability p(Y do X=x ′ = y ′ |x, y, f ). 4 Based on this, we can first translate Q into a counterfactual probability query p(Y do X=x ′ = y ′ |x, y, f ). Then, based on Section 2.2 and in particular Proposition 1, we can calculate the approximate answerp(Y do X=x ′ = y ′ |x, y, f ) from the CGM M , if H(E|W ) is small.
Discussion: advantages over previous approaches
For researchers familiar with causal inference, some of the steps described above may same trivial. However, all current approaches the authors of this paper are aware of are lacking a principled language (with terms such as "causal sufficiency" or "causes of a variable") and methodology for such things as integration of sandbox experiments and performance debugging. In the case of sandbox experiments [7, 18] , this may lead to errors, e.g., if not all parents (direct causes) of a variable X are varied during the experiment and regressed upon afterwards, or X is regressed on it causal children. In the case of performance debugging [13] , errors may, in certain cases, arise from confusing causation with correlation (note that there is other work in that direction [16] , which relies less on causal semantics, and thus cannot make this mistake). The main advantage of the approach to control of cloud systems that we outline, compared to e.g. [14] which is based on adaptive control, is that one can encode and harness prior knowledge about which mechanisms vary and which stay invariant.
Note that generally, one could try to learn (in the sense of machine learning) things such as how to perform and integrate the experiment [16] , but one would always have to rely on prior assumptions, which may then be more difficult to encode.
Problem 2 and approach: cost predictability versus privacy
We start with the problem statement (Section 4.1), followed by our approach (Section 4.2). Then we present a toy example (Section 4.3), and some additional remarks (Section 4.4).
Problem statement
Here we consider an economical aspect of cloud computing. Currently, one common way for clients to purchase cloud resources from a provider is via an auction mechanism for "spot" (i.e., short-term) resources, which, in a simplified way, can be described as follows: the customer enters a bid, e.g. for an hour of usage, and once the price determined by the provider (based on supply, demand, and other private factors) drops below the bid, the customer gets the resource, usually as long as her bid exceeds the price (within the hour). This approach has several advantages, in particular for the provider: he can sell resources which are unused but which fluctuate a lot (due to guarantees given to "dedicated" or "ondemand" customers). But also clients can profit: the spot resources are usually significantly cheaper than the longer-term dedicated resources.
An obvious drawback of spot resources is that for the clients, this kind of mechanism comes with a high uncertainty: it is hard to tell how the prices will evolve in the future, and in particular, purchased resources can be terminated in an unforeseeable way, which is, to some extent, due to the unpredictability of the other clients. Therefore, if the client does not want to take these risks which can significantly harm his/her business, they often avoid this mechanism.
General approach
In what follows we present a first step towards addressing the problem. We assume that there is one provider, and clients 1, . . . , K. By "stakeholders" we refer to provider and clients together. For each time point (say, the beginning of an hour), let X k denote client k's demand for the next hour, Y k the cloud product that the client buys from the provider, W k the information based on which the client decides her demand (e.g. hour of the day), which may not always be fully known though, and π k her policy determining which cloud product Y k to buy, given her demand X k . Let X 0 denote the provider's pricing parameter at that time point (which may depend, e.g., on energy costs), and let Z denote the outcome of the provider's mechanism applied to the Y k . We assume the following simple mechanism (which is a simplified version of the auction described above): all clients k always get the product they want, but the subsequent price vector Z (possibly including additional costs e.g. from loss of visitors through termination) varies and is not known in advance. The causal diagram G 2 for the complete causal structure, for the case K = 2, is depicted in Figure 2 .
Our approach to the uncertainty problem, towards more predictable prices and subsequent reduced costs, is based on the idea that clients may not want to share all, but are willing to share some of their information between each other. More specifically, we propose the following two-step procedure which allows the clients to trade off privacy versus predictability interests, by jointly picking a variable C such that p(X k |C) allows an approximate prediction of Z which still preserves some privacy. 
4.2.1
Step 1A: jointly picking C First, all stakeholders k pick their candidates for C (possibly based on a agiven list and some "privacy budget"), balancing their privacy interests against minimizing H(X k |C). If the intersection of their candidates is non-empty, they reveal H(X k |C) for all k and joint candidates C. 6 They pick the C that minimizes k H(X k |C) to optimize the predictability, based on Proposition 2.
Step 2B: prediction and individual decision
Now all clients k reveal their p(x k |c). Furthermore, all p(y k |x k , π k ) are either known a priori (based on the possible products the provider offers) or revealed now. The provider reveals p(z|y 0 , . . . , y K , c). Now, in a first approximation, based on Proposition 2, the clients narrow down the set of possible p(Z|π 1 , . . . , π K ) to those for which
Then, if possible, further restrictions on p(Z|π 1 , . . . , π K ) are derived from the available information. Based on the approximate prediction, each client k decides on their π k , either individually, or based on collaboration with the others (e.g., based on game-theoretic considerations).
Toy example
A cloud provider, Clark, offers to his clients, Alice (k = 1) and Bob (k = 2), monthly (dedicated) large resources (Y k = 2), rather expensive, or hourly spot small (Y k = 0) and large (Y k = 1) resources, which are usually cheaper. However, if Alice and Bob happen to both order large spot resource for the same hour, the cost for both of them ([Z] 1 , [Z] 2 ) is significantly higher than the hourly rate for the monthly large resource, since Clark may have to buy a new resource, or he may have to cancel one of his client's applications, causing the loss of web site visitors. Now assume Alice and Bob, during Step 1A, pick the hourly weather forecast, which is 0 for sunny and 1 for cloudy, for C, since it is public information anyway that their web sites are weather related: Alice runs a website for outdoor activities, Bob one for indoor activities, both in the same region); and the remaining uncertainty w.r.t.
their demand (X k being 0 for "small" or 1 for "high"), i.e., H(X k |C), is small. The causal diagram for this scenario is G 2 depicted in Figure 2 . Based on this, Alice and Bob can conclude that they will rarely require a large resource at the same time, and they can go for spot resources as their respective (dominant) strategies π k .
Discussion
In some cases, the provider could infer the joint distribution of all X k , based on past data, which would contain all relevant information. However, the complete system is so complex that it is unlikely to be stationary. Note that during each step, already some information is revealed, but this is transparent to the stakeholders. Limitations of our approach are that (1) the clients may not even be willing to reveal their p(x k ), or (2) X k may not be predictable or the model may be wrong (although humans and organizations usually do plan ahead).
Experiments
Control and debugging problem (Section 3) on real cloud system
Here we test essential parts of our approach in Section 3.2 on a simple real cloud system: a physical server running a specific application (a web server) together with some concurrent workload (another web server). A source H keeps sending simultaneous request to application and concurrent workload (drawn from a mutlivariate correlated Poisson distribution), of which R are received by the application and S by the concurrent workload. Then, for each request, the latency (performance) of the application is measured in nanoseconds by L.
First experiment:
We examine how well Step 1A works. First, we infer the causal diagram G 1 depicted in Figure 1 , as well as an estimate of p(r, s, l) from observational samples of the system, based on Step 1A, and together denote them by (incomplete) M 1 . Then, from M 1 , using back-door adjustment [15] , we derive a predictionp(l|do s) for p(l|do s). Besides
Step 1A, this tests the applicability of Step 1C, when thinking of a simple controller that outputs a constant for S (e.g. by putting the application on another machine with such a concurrent workload), as well as Step 1D which relies on post-interventional distributions (of an updated model though). The outcome is depicted in Figure 3 , where we use the 99th percentile as statistic, which is common in cloud computing. It shows that the prediction is close to the ground truth test data, both in magnitude and in trend.
Second experiment: We examine how well Step 1B works. First, we perform a randomized interventional experiment on the system to infer p(l| (do)(r, s) ), which can be seen as a sandbox experiment. From this together with p(r, s) from the system in its target configuration (similar to the observational stage above) and G 1 , we predict the 99th percentile of p(l) (during target configuration) to be 0. k H(X x |C) (dashed red).
Predictability-privacy problem (Section 4) on simulated data
For our approach in Section 4.2 to work,p(z) has to approximate p(z) reasonably well. Here we examine to what extent this is the case in a simulated version of the toy example in Section 4.3, additionally testing how tight the bound in Proposition 2 is. Compared to the toy example, we restrict to spot resources, i.e., 0, 1 for Y k , and assume the following specific mechanisms: The policy π k is for both to simply purchase their demand (Y k := X k ), Clark's pricing is "cheap" (Z = 0) versus "very expensive for one of them since both want large" (Z = 1), in particular Z := Y 1 AND Y 2 . Furthermore,
where D is some confounder which Alice and Bob do not want to reveal. Now for "each" 0 ≤ r ≤ 0.5, we draw 1000 samples of C ∼ Bernoulli(0.5 − r), D ∼ Bernoulli(r) to find out how wrongp(z) gets when increasing the confounder D that is not revealed or adjusted for, and N X k ∼ Bernoulli(0.2 − 0.2r) (to also examine a little variation in the noise strength). The outcome is depicted in Figure 4 . It shows thatp(z) is a good estimate in this simple setting (which is also due to the fact that already p(x 1 ), p(x 2 ) alone reveal something about p(x 1 , x 2 )). It also shows that (in this setting), the bound from Proposition 2 may be improvable.
Related work
Regarding Section 2, approximations to non-identifiable quantities in causal models were examined by [3] . While their technique does not seem directly applicable to the setup of Proposition 1, it may allow to derive stronger statements, i.e., further narrowing down the set of possible p(z), than Proposition 2, which could be examined in future work. We discussed some related work for Section 3, i.e., the control and debugging problem, in Section 3.3. Additionally, maybe the work closest to our investigation in that section is [10] , which suggests to use causal models for performance modeling of programs, but does not consider counterfactuals, or more complex computing systems. The relation between causality and control is also considered in [5] . Regarding Section 4, [1] can be seen as related in that they allow the provider to hide their exact costs while still making some information of the costs available to others. The work [11] investigates privacy-preserving mechanisms, but does not consider the integration of the revealed information to an (estimate) of a causal model.
Conclusions
This paper assayed how causal inference can help with technological and economical problems in cloud computing. Guided by these problems, we presented two theoretical results for approximate causal inference, and reported initial experimental results. The application of causal inference in this domain is, to the best of our knowledge, the first of its kind. We believe the potential in this area is very significant, both for applications and for methodological work. Problems in computing systems rarely fit the standard i.i.d. setting that machine learning excels at. A causal perspective with its focus on predicting the effect of interventions may be a crucial component in future developments, ideally combined with aspects of game theory and mechanism design, to extend our approach for the predictability-privacy trade-off.
On the other hand, we have 
where equation (17) 
where inequality (27) follows from the monotonicity (which follows from the chain rule) of the Kullback-Leibler divergence [8] together with equations (24) and (10), equation (31) is the chain rule for mutual information, and I(W : U 0 ) = 0 is due to U 0 not influencing W and Markovianity.
Note that, if we chose the set Z in the above proposition such that it is as "close" (in the causal diagram) to Y as possible, this could yield better approximations p W (Y do X=x = y|e) than simply letting Z be the root nodes, as done inp(Y do X=x = y|e). We leave this as a question for future work.
B Proof of Proposition 2
Here we give a proof for Proposition 2. 
where inequality (33) follows from the monotonicity (which follows from the chain rule) of the Kullback-Leibler divergence [8] .
